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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
LARRY SHELMIDINE, et al., 
Plaintiffs-Respondents/ 
CHARLENE POLLY COOK, 
Intervenor, Case No. 
: 14152 
-vs -
CHARLES A. JONES, et al., 
Defendants-Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellants, Charles A. Jones, et al., appeal 
from the granting to respondent of an Extraordinary Writ in the 
Nature of Prohibition prohibiting appellants as lay judges 
from imposing imprisonment or jail sentences upon a conviction 
of the offense over which they otherwise have jurisdiction. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The District Court of the Third Judicial District, 
State of Utah# the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., Judge, 
granted respondents' petition for extraordinary writ in the 
nature of prohibition prohibiting appellants as lay judges 
from imposing imprisonment or jail sentences upon a convic-
tion of the offense over which they otherwise have jurisdiction. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the lower court's 
order granting a writ of prohibition and a remand of the 
case for further proceedings on the charges filed against 
respondents. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents were charged with the crime of driving 
under the influence of intoxicating liquor, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-6-44 (1953), as amended. Respondent Larry J. Shelmidine's 
case was set for trial before appellant Charles A. Jones on 
January 16, 1975. Respondent John R. Reeves' case was set 
for trial before Lynn D. Bernard on March 25, 1975. Respondent 
-2-
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Charlene P. Cook's case was set for trial before Charles A. 
Jones on April 10, 1975. 
The penalty involved if respondents are found 
guilty is imprisonment for not less than thirty days nor 
more than six months, or by a fine of not less than $100 nor 
more than $299, or by both such fine and imprisonment. 
Trials for all respondents were stayed pending 
the outcome of this case. ' 
Respondents sought a petition for extraordinary 
writ of prohibition forbiding appellants from hearing criminal 
cases where imposition of imprisonment or jail sentence was 
poss ible. 
The Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., granted 
respondents an extraordinary writ of prohibition, modified from 
respondents' petition, forbiding appellants from imposing 
imprisonment or jail sentence upon conviction of the offenses 
over which they otherwise have jurisdiction. 
It is from this order that appeal and reversal is 
sought. ; 
-3-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE UTAH JUSTICE OF THE PEACE SYSTEM GUARANTEES 
DUE PROCESS. 
Respondents contended in the lower court that the 
Utah Justice of the Peace system denies defendants due process 
in criminal cases heard and tried by a non-attorney judge 
where imprisonment is imposed. The Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, 
Jr ., Third Judicial District Judge, he Id t hat following a 
criminal case, the imposition of a jail sentence or imprison-
ment by a non-attorney judge denies the defendant the rights 
to fair trial and to counsel and is void. (The Court did not 
rule on the respondents' equal protection argument.) 
Appellants submit that the Utah Justice of the Peace 
system as presently constituted guarantees due process and 
that the right to a fair trial and the right to counsel are 
preserved within our justice court and "two-tiered" court 
systems . • .' 
-4-
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A. THE UTAH JUSTICE OF THE PEACE SYSTEM INSURES 
THE REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD OF A FAIR TRIAL. 
In Snyder v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the 
United States Supreme Court stated that a state is free to: 
" . . . regulate the procedure 
of i ts courts in accordance with its 
own conception of policy and fairness 
unless in so doing it offends some 
principle of justice so rooted in the 
traditions and conscience of our people 
as to be ranked as fundamental . . . 
Its procedure does not run afoul of the 
Fourteenth Amendment because another 
method may seem to our thinking to be 
fairer or wiser or to give a surer 
promise of protection to the prisoner 
at the bar." 291 U.S. 97, 54 S.Ct. 330, 
78 L.Ed. 674 (1934) . 
The value and necessity of allowing each state a great deal 
of leeway in making its own policy determinations by balancing 
the individual and social costs in the due process considera-
tion has long been recognized by the United States Supreme 
Court. Though Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 62 S.Ct. 1144, 
86 L.Ed. 591 (1942), was overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 
372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963), this part 
of the opinion still has application: 
-5-
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"Asserted denial / of due 
process of law_J7 is to be tested 
by an appraisal of the totality of 
facts in a given case. That which 
may, in one setting, constitute a 
denial of fundamental fairness, 
shocking to the universal sense of 
justice, may, in other circumstances, 
and in the light of other considera-
tions, fall short of such denial. In 
the application of such a concept, . 
there is always the danger of falling 
into the habit of formulating the 
guarantee into a set of hard and 
fast rules, the application of which 
in a given case may be to ignore the 
qualifying factors therein disclosed." 
316 U.S. at 462. 
Thus, due process has a standard of common sense, 
weighing a standard of fairness and another standard of 
facts and circumstances, to determine if a particular proceed-
ing meets with the constitutional requisites and insures the 
defendant the reasonable likelihood of a fair trial. 
The denial of due process must be the denial of 
"fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of 
justice." Kingsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 
U.S. 234, 80 S.Ct. 297, 4 L.Ed.2d 268 (1960). Therefore, the 
crucial factor in determining the judicial qualifications of 
-6-
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a jus t i ce of the peace is whether he is capable of being 
fa i r and impar t i a l . I t i s not a question of whether a 
jus t ice can, in a l l ins tances , conduct an e r ro r - f ree t r i a l . 
The due process clause has never been interpreted to guarantee 
the accused an e r r o r - f r e e t r i a l . Beck v. Washington, 369 
U.S. 541, 82 S.Ct . 955, 8 L.Ed.2d 98 (1962), Cf. Colten v . 
Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 1953, 32 L.Ed.2d 84 (1972). 
Appellant contends that a lay judge is capable of 
being as fair and impartial as an attorney judge. The Arizona 
Supreme Court, in their recent landmark case upholding the 
Arizona Justice Court system held: 
"The fact that a Justice of the 
Peace is not an attorney does not mean 
that he is per se unqualified to declare 
"the law in the limited type of situations 
over which he has jurisdiction. The 
fact that a judicial error may be made in 
a proceeding does not necessarily imply a 
denial of due process of law. The 14th 
Amendment does not assure immunity from 
judicial error." Crouch v. Justice of 
Peace Court of the 6th Precinct, 7 Ariz. 
App. 460, 440 P.2d 1,000 (1968). 
-7-
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The case of Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 
345, 92 S.Ct. 2119f 32 L.Ed.2d 783 (1972), is in point in 
this regard. The United States Supreme Court held that it 
was within the bounds of due process for the City of Tampa 
to authorize municipal court clerks who were neither lawyers 
or judges to issue warrants, stating that the requirement of 
being neutral and detached could be met by a layman under 
judicial supervision. The defendant in Shadwick argued that 
a lay clerk was incapable of understanding and applying the 
principles embodied in the Fourth Amendment. To this, the 
Court answered: 
11
 It is less than clear, however, ' 
as to who would qualify as a 'judicial 
officer1 under appellant's theory. 
There is some suggestion in appellant's 
brief that a judicial officer must be a 
lawyer or the municipal court judge 
himself. . . But it has never been held 
that only a lawyer or judge could grant 
a warrant, regardless of the court system 
or the type of warrant involved. In 
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 
270-271 (1960), the Court implied that 
United States Commissioners, many of 
whom were not lawyers or judges, were 
nonetheless 'independent judicial 
officers.,,, Id. at 347-48. 
-8-
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The Court then stated that the test for the qualifications 
of a magistrate was whether he was detached and capable of 
determining probable cause, and held that non-lawyer magistrates 
were capable of meeting the test. 
"Appellant likewise has failed to 
demonstrate that these clerks lack 
capacity to determine probable cause. 
Our legal system has long entrusted 
non-lawyers to evaluate more complex 
and significant factual data than that 
in the case at hand . . . The significance 
and responsibility of these lay judgments 
betray any belief that the Tampa clerks 
could not determine probable cause for 
arrest. What we . . . reject today is any 
per se invalidation of a state or local 
warrant system on the ground that the 
issuing magistrate is not a lawyer or a 
judge. Communities may have sound reasons 
for delegating the responsibility of 
issuing warrants to competent personnel 
other than judges or lawyers." Id. at 
352. (Emphasis added.) 
While the Shadwick case decided only that non-lawyer, 
non-judicial clerks were constitutionally capable of deciding 
probable cause, it is relevant to the present case. The issue 
presently before the Court is whether non-lawyer Justices of 
the Peace are per se unqualified to declare the law in a limited 
-9-
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type of misdemeanor situations. The Shadwick court would 
reject such a blanket disqualification. 
The Court in Shadwick placed great stock in the 
fact that the non-lawyer clerks who were deciding probable 
cause had limited jurisdiction and were closely supervised 
by judicial officers. Similarly, under the Utah system, 
Justices of the Peace benefit from required legal training, 
close supervision by higher courts, and limited jurisdiction. 
Utah law requires close supervision and training of 
all Justices of the Peace, assuring that the system meets with 
reasonable fairness and due process. Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-27, 
passed in 1971, sets up a mandatory system of continuing 
education for Justices of the Peace: 
"All justices of the peace shall 
attend one of two annual institutes to 
be supervised by the Utah Supreme Court. 
Any justice not attending one institute 
during the year shall vacate his office 
unless he has obtained a written excuse 
for good cause from the chief justice 
of the state Supreme Court." 
It shou ]d also be noted that the Manual for Justices of the 
Peace in the State of Utah, Bodenheimer, University of Utah 
Press (1956) /_ Revised in 1974_7 by law must be made available 
-10-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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to every justice of the peace: 
"Each county, city or town shall 
provide and keep current for each 
justice of the peace within its juris-
diction, a copy of the motor vehicle 
laws of Utah, handbook for justices 
of the peace as approved by the Utah 
Supreme Court, state laws affecting 
municipalities and its county, city or 
town ordinances." Utah Code Ann. § 
78-5-1.2. 
From these two statutes, it is apparent that Utah recognizes 
the need for and has taken steps to assure the legal quality 
of its justices of the peace. Both the continuing education 
requirement and the content of the Justice of the Peace Manual 
are under the supervision of the Utah Supreme Court, thus 
assuring that the necessary and accurate legal information 
will be imparted to all justices of the peace. The Manual 
is very thorough and contains, among other things, a detailed 
outline of a criminal trial and sections on evidentiary and 
sentencing procedures and problems. 
However, probably the most valuable form of "continuing 
education" is the Justice's of the Peace continuous exposure to 
similar types of litigation. Over eighty percent of the cases 
-11-
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before Justice Courts are traffic violations. Because of 
this, the justice becomes a specialist in handling certain 
types of cases, further insuring his awareness of and 
capability of handling all legal issues. 
Beyond the educational requirements, Utah law also 
sets up a supervisory scheme which anticipates a thorough 
review of the disposition of cases in justice courts. Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-5-31 provides: 
"Every justice of the peace shall 
file a monthly report with his respective 
county attorney stating the number of 
criminal prosecutions in his precinct, 
the character of the offenses charged, the 
number of convictions, the amount of fines 
and penalties imposed, and the amount 
. collected. Reports shall be filed the 
first Monday of the following month." 
The justice courts are also subject to and receive 
the benefits provided under the Court Administrator Act, thus 
further assuring that the practices and procedures in justice 
courts will be uniform with those in all other state courts. 
For example, Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-21 (1953), provides: 
-12-
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"(3) The (judicial) council 
shall be responsible for the develop-
ment of uniform administrative policy 
for the courts throughout the state. 
The chief judge shall be responsible 
for the implementation of the policies 
developed by the council and for the 
general management of the courts with 
the aid of the administrator. The 
council shall have the following powers, 
duties and responsibilites: 
(a) Establish general policies 
for the operation of the courts, including 
uniform rules and forms for practice and 
procedure, consistent with law and the 
provisions of this act." 
Of course, Utah Code Ann. § 77-57-43 (1953), provides 
automatic "Trial de Novo" from a verdict of guilty in a justice 
court, further insuring direct supervision by the higher courts. 
See Trial de Novo, infra. These three sections of Utah law 
evidence the State's concern for assuring the existence of a 
uniform and fair judicial system. Recognizing the need for 
Justice Courts, the State has made the effort to assure that 
such Courts comport with due process. The United States Supreme 
Court has recognized that such systems meet the due process 
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Shadwick 
v. City of Tampa, supra. 
-13-
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Another element of the Justice of the Peace system 
in Utah, which assures compliance with due process standards 
under the Shadwick decision, is that Justices of the Peace 
have very limited criminal jurisdiction. Article VIII Section 
8 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
"The legislature shall determine 
the number of justices of the peace to 
be elected, and shall fix by law their 
powers, duties and compensation. The 
jurisdiction of Justices of the Peace 
shall be as now provided by law, but 
the legislature may restrict the same." 
Pursuant to this constitutional mandate, Utah Code Ann. § 
78-5-4 (1953), narrowly restricts the jurisdiction of justice 
courts. 
"Justices' courts have jurisdiction 
of the following public offenses committed 
within the respective counties in which 
such courts are established: 
(1) Petit Larceny. 
(2) Assault or battery not charged 
to have been committed upon a public 
officer in the discharge of his duties or 
to have been committed with such intent 
as to render it a felony. 
(3) Breaches of the peace, committing 
a willful injury to property and all mis-
demeanors punishable by a fine less than $300 
• ' or by imprisonment in the county jail or 
municipal prison not exceeding 6 months, or 
by both such fine and imprisonment." 
-14-
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The importance of this limited jurisdiction is stressed in 
the Justice's Manual, which devotes a chapter to the subject 
of criminal jurisdiction and discusses the entire scope and 
limits of justice court jurisdiction. The Manual admonishes 
the Justice Court judge to decide the jurisdiction issue prior 
to any other action. 
"The first question a justice of the 
peace must consider, when someone comes 
before him to file a criminal complaint, is 
whether he has jurisdiction over the subject 
matter . . . This question is of very great 
importance to him. If he tries and punishes 
an offender in a case in which he has no 
jurisdiction, the whole proceedings are null 
and void and he may under certain circumstances 
also become liable for damages." Manual for 
Justices of the Peace in the State of Utah, 
page 19. 
In conclusion, the United States Supreme Court 
recognizes the need for non-attorney judicial officers and 
sanctions their use where there is an adequate system of 
supervision and limited jurisdiction. Utah law provides for 
such a system and thus is within the bounds of due process. 
B. THE RIGHT TO A TRIAL DE NOVO FROM A VERDICT OF 
GUILTY IN A JUSTICE COURT FURTHER PRESERVES THE DEFENDANT'S 
RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL AND RIGHT TO COUNSEL. 
-15-
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Appellant has contended that the procedures and safe-
guards set up by the State insure the accused of a fair trial 
before a justice of the peace. However, the State further 
guarantees, by statute, that a defendant who is found guilty 
by a trial before a justice of the peace has a right to a trial 
de novo, without the need to allege error, so long as he applies 
within the statutory time. Utah Code Ann. § 77-57-43 (1953). 
Furthermore/ if the defendant wishes to bypass the justice court 
altogether, he may plead guilty and obtain a trial de novo 
without prejudice. See Weaver v. Kimball, 5 9 Utah 72, 202 Pac. 9 
(1921), where the Utah Supreme Court held that even though the 
defendant had pleaded guilty to a criminal charge in city court, 
his right to trial de novo in the district court was still 
preserved under (what is now) Utah Code Ann. § 77-57-38 (1953). 
This two-tier system for adjudicating less serious 
criminal cases was held by the United States Supreme Court in 
Colten v. Kentucky, supra, meet the demands of due process. 
Colten dealt with the alleged unconstitutionality of levying 
a larger fine on trial de novo than was originally assessed in 
-16-
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the justice court (on the basis of North Carolina v. Pearcef 
395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969)), Colten 
had been convicted of a misdemeanor and fined $10. Upon being 
granted trial de novo (an absolute right in Kentucky, as in 
Utah), he was again convicted and then fined $50. 
Defendant suggested that the two-tier system forced . 
him to "endure a trial in an inferior court with less than 
adequate protections in order to secure a trial comporting 
completely with constitutional guarantees." The court acknowledged 
that many states do not provide full constitutional safeguards, 
but held that where a trial de novo was available as a matter of 
right, the two-tier system was not violative of due process: 
11
 . . . /~~T_J7he inferior courts 
are not designed or equipped to conduct 
error-free trials, .or to insure full 
recognition of constitutional freedoms. 
They are courts of convenience, to 
provide speedy and inexpensive means 
of disposition of charges of minor 
offenses, Colten v. Commonwealth, 
467 S.W.2d at 379. 
(M)any . . . systems . . . lack 
some of the safeguards provided in more 
serious criminal cases . . . Some, 
including Kentucky, do not record pro-
ceedings and the judges may not be 
trained for their positions either by 
experience or schooling. 
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We are not persuaded, however 
that the Kentucky arrangement for 
dealing with the less serious offenses 
disadvantages defendants any more or 
any less than trials conducted in a 
court of general jurisdiction in the 
first instance, as long as the latter 
are always available." 407 U.S. at 
113,118. 
The court in Colten recognized the problem with non-
attorney judges, yet approved of a system which utilized them. 
Appellant contends that this answers an issue presently before 
this Court; utilization of non-attorney judges to hear lower 
misdemeanor offenses does not violate due process where the 
right to a trial de novo exists. 
The Colten decision properly recognized that justice 
courts, besides offering a speedy trial, quick deliberation of 
the issues, convenience, and monetary savings to both defendant 
and state, offer certain strategical advantages to the defendant: 
"Proceedings in the inferior courts 
are simple and speedy . . . Such proceedings 
offer a defendant the opportunity to learn 
about the prosecution's case and, if he 
chooses, he need not reveal his own. He 
may also plead guilty without a trial and 
promptly secure a de novo trial in a court 
of general criminal jurisdiction. He 
cannot, and will not, face the realistic 
threat of a prison sentence in the inferior 
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court without having the help of counsel, 
whose advice will also be available in 
determining whether to seek a new trial, 
with the slate wiped clean, or to accept 
the penalty imposed by the inferior court. 
The State has no such options. Should it 
not prevail in the lower court, the case 
is terminated, whereas the defendant has 
the choice of beginning anew. In reality 
his choices are to accept the decision 
of the judge and the sentence imposed in 
the inferior court or to reject what in 
effect is no more than an offer in settle-
ment of his case and seek the judgment of 
judge or jury in the superior court, with 
sentence to be determined by the full 
record made in that court . . . We cannot 
say that the Kentucky trial de novo system, 
as such, is unconstitutional or that it 
presents hazards warranting the restraints 
called for in North Carolina v. Pearce, 
particularly since such restraints might, 
to the detriment of both defendant and 
State, diminish the likelihood that inferior 
courts would impose lenient sentences 
whose effect would be to limit the discre-
tion of a superior court judge or jury if 
the defendant is retried and found guilty." 
407 U.S. at 119. (Emphasis added.) 
Appellant submits that such remarks apply to the Utah Justice 
Court system as well as the Kentucky system, since both are 
virtually identical. 
The Court's characterization of an inferior court's 
judgments as "an offer in settlement" is particularly discerning 
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since the bulk of the cases handled in such courts are traffic 
violations. Uhlman, Justifying Justice Courts, 52 Judicature 
22 (1966). 
* 
In light of due process standards, it is reasonable 
for a state to relegate the bulk of its minor criminal cases 
through an inferior court system where procedures are more 
relaxed as long as access to a more sophisticated court is 
guaranteed. 
Appellant contends that all the cases involving the 
issue of non-attorney judges presiding over misdemeanor cases, 
where a right to a trial de novo existed, have held that due 
process was not violated. In Crouch v. Justice of Peace Court of 
Sixth Precinct, supra, the defendant was charged with driving 
under the influence of intoxicating liquor, as are respondents 
in the present case. Upon his conviction the defendant appealed, 
claiming that the non-attorney justice's giving of jury instruc-
tions as to the law was violative of due process. The Arizona 
Appellate Court held that the giving of such instructions by a 
non-attorney judge does not deny a criminal misdemeanant due 
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process of law. This case has been cited by Arizona Appellate 
courts in upholding the validity of preliminary hearings, 
involving a felony, presided over by a non-attorney justices 
of the peace. State v. Lynch, 197 Ariz. 463, 489 P.2d 698 (1971); 
State v. Dziqqel, 16 Ariz.App. 289, 492 P.2d 1227 (1972). 
The Illinois Supreme Court in City of Decatur v. 
Kushner, 43 111.2d 334, 253 N.E.2d 425 (1969), and the Federal 
District Court of Mississippi in Mellikan v. Avent, 300 F.Supp. 
516 (D.C. Miss. 1969), upheld the use of non-attorney judges. 
Both courts casually dismissed the issue, it seems, without 
doubt as t o t h e f i r m c o n s t i t u t i o n a l b a s i s f o r n o n - a t t o r n e y j u s t i c e s . 
"The c o n t e n t i o n t h a t t h e j u s t i c e 
of t h e p e a c e c o u r t i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
b e c a u s e a j u s t i c e of t h e peace may be a 
p e r s o n who i s not t r a i n e d i n t h e law i s 
un ique and of no m e r i t . " M e l l i k a n v . 
Aven t , 300 F . S u p p . 516 a t 519 (D.C.N.D. . 
M i s s . , 1 9 6 9 ) . 
j \ 
R e s p o n d e n t , i n e a r l i e r memoranda, d i s m i s s e d t h e v a l u e 
of t h e above c a s e s b e c a u s e t h e y were p r e - A r g e r s i n g e r v . Haml in , 
407 U . S . 2 5 , 92 S . C t . 1983 , 32 L . E d . 2 d 530 ( 1 9 7 2 ) . A p p e l l a n t 
c o n t e n d s t h a t r e s p o n d e n t p u t s t o o much f a i t h i n A r g e r s i n g e r 
and a t t e m p t s t o e x t e n d i t s h o l d i n g t o o f a r . I n t h e o n l y p o s t -
A r g e r s i n g e r c a s e q u e s t i o n i n g a n o n - a t t o r n e y ' s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
- 2 1 -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
authority to try criminal prosecutions (and subsequently 
imprison if needed) in a system guaranteeing trial de novo, 
the Kentucky Appellate Court forcefully upheld the entire 
lay-man judge, two-tier inferior court system using the 
same rationale as all the above cases: "The fact that the 
accused needs a lawyer to defend him does not mean that he 
needs to be tried before a lawyer judge." Ditty v. Hampton 
K£.;'490 S.W.2d 772 (1972), appeal dismissed 414 U.S. 885 (1973). 
The Court recognized that in cases supporting 
Argersinger's right to counsel, such as In re Gault, 387 
U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1966), or White v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 83 S.Ct. 1050, 10 L.Ed.2d 193 (1962), 
the Supreme Court never questioned whether the involved pro-
ceedings were conducted by non-attorney magistrates and judges. 
Therefore, the Kentucky Court dismissed the Argersinger 
argument, concluding that "there never has been any thought that 
a right to be tried by a lawyer judge grows out of the right to 
be defended by a lawyer." 490 S.W.2d at 774. 
Respondent has attempted to apply the Argersinger 
argument to this state by citing Gordon v. Justice Court of Yuba, 
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115 Cal.Rptr. .632, 12 Cal.3d 323, 525 P.2d 72 (1974). However, 
this is only building error on error. As Ditty v. Hampton, 
supra, has shown, the Argersinger argument cannot successfully 
be applied to two-tier court systems such as Kentucky and Utah. 
To show its affect upon the California Justice Court system, 
which is not two-tiered and therefore is radically different 
in affecting defendant's due process rights, only tends to 
confuse the issues. 
The California Justice Court system is inherently 
infested with due process infirmities not present in Utah's 
two-tier system. Under California law, .the accused does not 
have a right to trial de novo, but must appeal his case, 
Cal. Penal Code § 1466 (West 1970). This involves the 
innumerable problems of burden of proof, grounds for appeal, 
time and expense. To complicate matters, the accused does not 
have an automatic right to appeal, but has such only at the 
discretion of the higher court, Cal. Penal Code § 1469 (West, 
1970). Thus, in California, the accused before the justice 
court is not automatically guaranteed a right to be tried before 
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an attorney-judge, but has such only if he can allege error 
prejudicial enough to persuade the higher court. 
To further add to the gross inadequacies of 
California's appellate scheme/ the justice courts are not 
courts of record (Cal. Const., Art VI, § 1). Thus, often 
times the appeal is based solely "upon a statement of the 
case settled or prepared by the non-attorney judge himself." 
115 Cal.Rptr. at 638. Also, Colten v. Kentucky, supra, spoke 
extensively about the dangers of vindictiveness inherent in 
the "appeal" system, see North Carolina v. Pearce, supra. 
The Utah Justice Court system is far more protective 
of the individual's rights. The accused may have the speedy 
trial with quick deliberation of all issues at little expense 
of time or money. He may plead guilty while still retaining 
his right to appeal or he may plead not guilty and force the 
prosecution to reveal its case against him. Following the 
verdict of the court—no matter what the determination—the 
accused is automatically entitled to a trial de novo. This 
guarantees an opportunity to be heard before an attorney-judge, 
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w i t h o u t a n y p r e j u d i c e o r i n f l u e n c e f rom t h e j u s t i c e c o u r t ' s 
r u l i n g s o r v e r d i c t . The de n o v o c o u r t g i v e s no h e e d t o t h e 
j u s t i c e c o u r t r e c o r d , t h u s i n s u r i n g t h a t w h i c h G o r d o n a t t e m p t s 
t o d o . I n a d d i t i o n , t h e " p o s s i b i l i t y o f v i n d i c t i v e n e s s f o u n d 
t o e x i s t i n P e a r c e /_ t h e a p p e a l s y s t e m _ J 7 i s n o t i n h e r e n t i n t h e 
K e n t u c k y /_ o r U t a h _ Z t w o - t i e r s y s t e m s . " D i t t y v . H a m p t o n , s u p r a 
a t 7 7 5 . 
T h u s , e f f e c t on t h e C a l i f o r n i a a p p e a l s y s t e m , i n h e r e n t l y 
i n f i r m i n p r o t e c t i n g t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' s due p r o c e s s r i g h t s , c a n n o t 
b e l o g i c a l l y e x t e n d e d t o t h e U t a h t w o - t i e r s y s t e m w h i c h e f f e c t i v e l y 
s a f e g u a r d s n o t o n l y t h e a c c u s e d ' s r i g h t t o a f a i r t r i a l , b u t h i s 
r i g h t t o a s p e e d y t r i a l a s w e l l . 
C . THE JUSTICE COURT SYSTEM IN UTAH PRESENTLY OPERATES 
TO GUARANTEE RATHER THAN VIOLATE DUE PROCESS. 
T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s S u p r e m e C o u r t h a s s t a t e d t h a t t h e 
" ( v ) i n d i c a t i o n o f C o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s u n d e r t h e d u e p r o c e s s 
c l a u s e d o e s n o t demand u n i f o r m i t y o f p r o c e d u r e by t h e s t a t e s . 
E a c h s t a t e i s f r e e t o d e v i s e i t s own way o f s e c u r i n g e s s e n t i a l 
j u s t i c e . . . . " H y s l e r v . F l o r i d a , 315 U . S . 4 1 1 , 4 1 6 , 62 S . C t . 
6 8 8 , 86 L . E d . 932 ( 1 9 4 2 ) . As p r e v i o u s l y m e n t i o n e d , t h e S u p r e m e 
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Court has held that a two-tier judicial system consisting of 
justice courts and a right to trial de novo meets with due 
process, and that the requirements that a magistrate be neutral 
and detached does not require him to be a lawyer. See Colten 
and Shadwick, supra. Thus, the due process question concerning 
non-attorney justices is properly left to each state. When 
applying the broad restraints of due process, a court should 
inquire into the nature of the demands on individual freedoms in 
relation to the social needs which justify these demands. Frank 
v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 363, 79 S.Ct. 804, 3 L.Ed.2d 877 
(1959) . 
As was stated earlier, the "asserted denial (of due 
process of law) is to be tested by an appraisal of the totality 
of facts in a given case. That which may, in one setting, 
constitute a denial of fundamental fairness, shocking to the 
universal sense of justice, may, in other circumstances, and 
in the light of other considerations, fall short of such denial." 
Betts v. Brady, supra, 316 U.S. at 462. 
While the complaint in this case is limited to Salt 
Lake County, a decision for the plaintiffs would have serious 
ramifications on the justice of the peace systems throughout 
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the entire state. (Here again, note that since the population 
distribution in Utah differs greatly from that in California, 
the due process considerations must be examined differently 
in the present case than in Gordon v. Yuba City, supra.) 
Because of its rural characteristics, it may be highly unfeasible, 
if not impossible, to have an attorney justice of the peace in. 
many of the rural counties of Utah. A study of the Utah 
court system has revealed: 
11
 (M) any counties do not have 
sufficient legal business or law 
trained personnel to justify city 
courts even at the county seats. 
Motorists, particularly tourists, 
either state residents or non-residents, 
could be subjected to considerable 
inconvenience if ready access to a method 
of adjudicating traffic violations were 
not available. An equally substantial 
burden would be imposed upon law enforce-
ment personnel if judicial officials 
were not readily available, particularly 
in view of the broadened constitutional 
protections being developed by the United 
States Supreme Court." Anderson & 
Lockhart, Utah Courts Today, Report to 
the Legislative Council, 34 (1966). 
The ANNUAL ROSTER OF ACTIVE RESIDENT UTAH ATTORNEYS of 1975 
reveals that there are no attorneys at all in Daggett, Morgan, 
Piute, Rich, Wayne and Kane Counties. Only one attorney 
resides in Garfield County and the counties of Beaver, Emery 
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and Summit have only two attorneys. Several other counties 
have only three or four attorneys residing within sparsely 
populated large geographical areas. These statistics demon-
strate that to require all justicesof the peace to be attorneys 
would toll the "death knell" to the justice of the peace 
system in much of Utah. Presently, at least in the rural 
districts of the state, the proposed requirement that justices 
of the peace be attorneys would not lead to fairer administration 
of justice, but exactly the opposite. Such problems could deny 
the accused his right to speedy trial, add considerable, expense 
and time to his right to trial, discourage him from participating 
in costly litigation, add to the increasing disrespect for law 
and courts, and handicap effective law enforcement and adjudica-
tion. Thus, a more thorough due process analysis, taking into 
account the specific circumstances of this case and weighing the 
relevant policy factors would seemingly compel the retention 
of the non-attorney justice of the peace. Appellant contends 
that the decision of whether to abolish the justice of the peace 
system or the use of non-attorney justices in that system is 
best left tothe state legislature. 
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The Supreme Court in Shadwick, supra, recognized 
that states had a valid interest in using competent lay 
personnel in their court systems: 
"Many municipal courts face stiff 
and unrelenting caseloads. A judge 
pressured with the docket before him may 
give warrant applications more brisk and 
summary treatment than would a clerk. 
All this is not to imply that a judge or 
lawyer would not normally provide the most 
desirable review of warrant requests. But 
our federal system warns of converting 
desirable practice into constitutional 
commandment. It recognizes in plural and 
diverse state activities one key to 
national innovation and vitality." 407 
U.S. at 353-54. (Emphasis added.) 
The Justice of the Peace system in Utah, by relieving 
an otherwise overwhelming caseload on city courts, is a guarantor 
rather than a violator of due process. Not only is it impossible 
to prove that a non-lawyer judge is per se less capable of 
handling a misdemeanor trial, it is very likely that doing away 
with such justices—with its concommitant effect on the entire 
system—would be a denial of due process and, perhaps, a denial 
of the right to a speedy trial. 
POINT II 
THE UTAH JUSTICE COURT SYSTEM DOES NOT DENY THE 
ACCUSED THE RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE COUNSEL. 
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The right to counsel in certain criminal prosecu-
tions is guaranteed by the "Sixth Amendment which in enumerated 
situations has been made applicable to the states by reason 
of the Fourteenth Amendment" and which "provided specified 
standards for 'all criminal prosecutions.'" Argersinger v. 
Hamlin, supra. The assistance of counsel when there is a 
potential for imprisonment, is required to comply with such a 
standard; so that a defendant may be adequately assured of his 
"right to be heard." Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 
55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932). It is, therefore, the function of 
counsel to assure this right of adequate representation. 
The function of the court, however, is radically 
different. The Kentucky Court succinctly stated the obvious: 
"Due process, as regards the tribunal 
hearing a case, usually has been considered 
to require only that the tribunal be fair 
and impartial. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 
133, 75 S.Ct. 623, 99 L.Ed.2d 942 (1955). 
The function of the court is not to 
defend the accused, or to represent him, 
but to decide fairly and impartially. An 
accused needs counsel to defend him, as 
pointed out in Gideon v. Wainwright, 
because the government employs lawyers to 
prosecute him—because our system of criminal 
justice is an adversary system. But the 
judge is not one of the accused's adversaries, 
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and is not there either to defend or to 
prosecute him. So the fact that the 
accused needs a lawyer to defend him 
does not mean that he needs to be tried 
before a lawyer judge." 490 S.W.2d at 
774-775. 
The United States Supreme Court has never acknowledged, 
either explicitly or implicitly, that an accused in a criminal 
prosecution had the right to an attorney-judge. In Ditty, the 
Court reviewed the cases making up the backbone of Arqersinqer; 
Gideon v. Wainwright, supra; Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 
88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968); White v. Maryland, supra; 
and In Re Gault, supra. The Kentucky Court concluded: 
"Never on the occasion of any of 
those decisions, was it even suggested 
that the right to counsel carries with 
it the right to be tried by a lawyer 
judge. Obviously, the Supreme Court was 
aware, when it decided White v. Maryland, 
that examining trials frequently are 
conducted by nonlawyer magistrates, and 
was aware, when it decided Gault, that 
juvenile court judges in many areas are 
not lawyers. Yet no question was 
recognized as existing with respect to 
the composition of the examining courts 
and juvenile courts. 
"All this is to show that there 
never has been any thought that a right 
to be tried by a lawyer judge grows out 
of the right to be defended by a lawyer." 
490 S.W.2d at 774. 
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The Court added: 
"We believe there are strong 
considerations that would support a 
holding that even if due process 
required lawyer judges for courts of 
general criminal jurisdiction, the 
requirement would not apply to the 
inferior courts in the Kentucky two-
tier system." Ibid at 776. 
It is interesting to note, in light of respondent's 
contentions that Argersinger demands an attorney-judge in 
criminal prosecutions resulting in imprisonment, that Colten v. 
Kentucky was decided the same day as Argersinger. Colten was also 
argued after Argersinger, allowing the court to make their deci-
sion supporting the Kentucky non-attorney judge, two-tier system 
after hearing all arguments supporting Argersinger'. 
In conclusion, the Supreme Court has never implied 
that the functions or the qualifications of the judge be 
the same to those of an attorney. Indeed, the opposite is 
true. The judge need only be fair and impartial. A formal 
legal training is not a prerequisite to fairness and 
impartiality. 
The non-attorney justice, because of his limited 
jurisdiction and similar cases, quickly becomes familiar 
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with and competent to handle recurring issues. In the court-
room, a fair and impartial resolution of complex questions 
can be made when counsel clarifies the issue while advocating 
his client's position. Whether or not error results, the 
accused has an automatic right to trial de novo to clarify 
or rectify any dispute. 
CONCLUSION 
Each state is allowed to regulate its own court 
procedure in the manner serving its interest best. The Utah 
Legislature has established a two-tiered system, with trial 
de novo, providing the accused with protections and rights 
that other states1 systems lack. The Legislature further 
insures the accused a fair trial in a justice of the peace 
court by requiring continuing legal education, close super-
vision by higher courts, and limited jurisdiction. 
All cases involving the issue of non-attorney judges 
presiding over misdemeanor cases, where a right to trial de 
novo existed, have held that due process was not violated. 
Gordon v. Justice Court, supra, is not applicable to the present 
case due to the radical differences between California's and 
Utah's Justice Court system. 
-33-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The right to effective representation by an 
attorney in criminal cases has never been held, nor 
inferred, by the United States Supreme Court to establish 
a right to an attorney-judge in misdemeanor cases resulting 
in imprisonment or jail sentence. 
For these reasons and for the reasons stated within 
these arguments, appellants contend that the decision of the 
lower court should be reversed and remanded for disposition 
not inconsistent with this Court's opinion. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT D. MOORE 
Rawlings, Rogers & Black 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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